

*Armandus of Bellovisu and Γεωργιος-Γενναδιος Σφραντζης Σχολαριος,
Commentary on the “De ente et essentia,”
by Thomas Aquinas.*

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*[Translation of Scholarios’ First Work against Aquinas’ Essence-Energies
Doctrine and a Defense of Gregory Palamas in Two Chapters]*

Chapter 93: If there is a composition (σύνθεσις) in God

[Armandus of Bellovisu’s Commentary on Aquinas’ De ente et essentia:]

We are not able to suppose this composition in God. For, if the essence (οὐσία) of God is per se also some energy (ἐνέργειά τις), it is but unable at any rate to take on the notion of potency (τὸν τῆς δυνάμεως λόγον). For the act of existence (τὸ εἶναι) does not but possess the other potencies [i.e., esse and essentia are really separate for orthodox Thomists], but this essence exists through these potencies, which are really (πραγματικῶς) all the items in God because of this (combination of potencies). If someone says that the essence of God is able to be considered as if the act of an essence that receives esse (τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσιν), and that its act of existence is, as if indeed something received, just as it is in creatures, and would also constitute some kind of composition of reason (σύνθεσιν τοῦ λόγου) with respect to God. Yet, one needs to know that the composition of reason is true, whenever something has been distinguished in re [in the thing itself] (αποκρίνηται τι ἐν τῷ πράγματι). Just as when we assert that the essence of angel in virtue of a res (πράγματι), viz., what really is in relation to itself, and that there is some act (ἐνέργειαν), and we say that the ‘act of existence’ is received by virtue of the thing (πράγματι) as something distinct (διάφορον) from the very essence. So, in this, the ‘composition of reason’ is this, which we suppose in the angel,

[P. 278] holds for something in re [or the thing itself] (ἐν τῷ πράγματι), but this is not so for God, for his essence, being that it is act (ἐνέργεια), does not receive the act of existence as differing from its essence. Whence, there is not ‘a composition of reason’ in him truly from these items [of essence and existence] on this account, for [the distinction] has no fundamentum in re (foundation in the thing itself; ἐν τῷ πράγματι), but is a composition by our soul (ψυχῆς), that was produced (πεποιημένη) or formed (πεπλασμένη).

[Scholarios’ Commentary on Armandus]

[Introduction:]

Now, among us [creatures], [Armandus’ Aquinas] posits such a kind of differentiation (διαφορότητα), out of which “a composition” would come about, but not in God, for we see that this kind of synthesis is in creatures, as was said above, **** yet we [Orthodox] are considering God through the path of creatures [known and real items outside the soul], and yet we say heartily that: ‘In Him such a kind composition of reason does exist!’** **“Now, ‘God is in every respect simple’ (ἀπλοῦς), and he is situated in the extreme of simplicity (ἀπλότητος),” about Whom, nonetheless, it is not in the least necessary for us to say: ‘nothing at all is distinguished in the thing itself’** **** just because of this [Armandus’] account. **** We send laud up to Him by means of many names, which are invoked concerning God, but now some sort of composition is not distinguished through “the composition of thought objects (νοημάτων) in us,” but for each name of the items predicated of God, something is distinguished in re (ἐν τῷ πράγματι).** So, in another manner, we would be deceived, after such names were supposed, i.e., following our attribution of some such kinds of names to God; namely: “God is good,” or that “He is true,” or some such item; clearly, this is an absurdity, for it reverts back to some kind of deformity as compared to Holy Scripture and with respect to the very truth itself! ******These aforementioned matters are expedient in regard to the sentential judgment of the doctor [Armandus]. So, we –speaking for**

ourselves— think that this rationale quite literally arises out of the [theological] matters below.

[Argument I]

[Section A:] Firstly, it is necessary to know that “God is most simple (ἀπλούστατος),” as was just said above and, thereby, that a composition following a quantity of parts (μερῶν) is not in him. Neither, then, is God a body, nor is he composed of matter (ὕλης) and form (εἶδους), since he is entirely immaterial (ἄϋλος), and nor is there a composition of a substrate (ὑποκειμένου) in Him;

[Section B:] **** for this very divine form (εἶδος), i.e., that the Godhead (ἡ θεότης), as one underlying (ὑφεστώς) as a subject (ὑποκείμενον), and per se has “this” (τοδί) act of existence and is an individual (ἄτομος). Whence, in no way is it different for us to believe in one Godhead, and one God, but these aforesaid are all this God, even if diversified by the mode of signification (τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς σημασίας). ****

[Section C:] Following from the aforesaid, neither is God composed of [1.] essence and [2.] nor of the act of existence, neither from [3.] genus, nor [4.] difference due to the fact that some potency (δύναμιν) in God may not be joined in act (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ), the potency of whom would be [consequently] received from some part of a genus, as in respect to all these having the character of composed items in this [aforesaid] manner. Also, neither is God in a genus at all, nor is he even so per analysis (ἀνάλυσιν), thinking that he is the principle of all beings (ἀρχή), according as some were wont to think. Yet, all the less, then, is there a composite of subject and accident, for it is not at all possible that an accident exists in him “who is simply (ἀπλῶς) first” and first cause of all things. Because **** there are so many and great modes of composition, and since according to nobody is there [such] a possibility that God is [thus] composed –for we believe that this [preoccupation of Armandus] is suitably avoided regarding composition and that God is**

first– through His very act of existence, he is also first and universal (κοινήν) cause. ** In no way does he harmonize with the act of being composed in some way. If every composed item has a unifying cause in itself, while presuming that these items differ per se (as otherwise they would not have been possible to be brought together into a unity from themselves), then this being is further of the nature of items placed together and has been fastened together from these [aforesaid] items.

[Argument II]

Secondly, it is necessary to understand that, ** in the case of things predicated about God, but even more so of those things attributed to the divine nature, there are items properly belonging to the first entelechy (ἐντελέχειαν) **:

[Section A:] ** They are opposed to the passive potency (τῇ παθητικῇ δυνάμει). This is just like the act of existence. This entelechy is active (δραστική) **.

[Distinction 1:] Although ** this active entelechy is opposite to the active potency (τῇ δραστικῇ δυνάμει), we nevertheless suppose, too, no passive potency in God, but only [suppose] the [aforementioned] active power (δραστικὴν δύναμιν). **

[Distinction 2:] ** Since these items belong to the active activity (δραστικὴν ἐνέργειαν), these have been ordered to [a.] Theoretical activity (θεωρητικὴν ἐνέργειαν): So, let them be called such! The theoretical activity is perfective (τελειωτική) of the same subject that possesses this activity. Such is to contemplate, to will, wisdom, and science. [b.] Projective power (προακτικήν): This is perfective of other sorts of things. After this energy has also been divided (διαιρουμένης) into two, two following items belong to those things by reason of their natural activity ** (τῇ φυσικῇ ἐνέργειᾳ): [i.] ** The first is within

(ἔνδον) God, as for instance begetting (γέννησις) and emanation (προβολή) whereby the divine hypostases are harmoniously projected (προάγονται) from the first hypostasis according to God's very form (εἶδος) of his nature. ** Now, there are ** items properly belonging to the volitional power (θελητικὴν ἐνέργειαν). [ii.] The second is an energy regarding what are ad extra (τὰ ἔξω), namely: An energy by which God's creatures exist: They subsist (ὑφίστανται), then they are perfected (τελειοῦνται) according to similitude (ὁμοιότητα) of the act of the will (βουλήσεως), but certainly not as a similitude of the act of nature (φύσεως). **

[Gloss on b.ii, supra:] ** After this volitional energy is also divided within itself, there are things proper in relation to that energy (ἐνέργειαν); namely, There is the energy by means of which beings came forth from absolute non-existence into the act of existence, viz., creation. There are things that properly befit that energy (ἐνέργειαν) through which beings came forth from the fact of non-existence (ἐκ τοῦ τι μὴ εἶναι) into the act of existing (εἰς τὸ τι εἶναι). ** Now, creation would be this very thing.

[Argument III]

[Excursus on Supposition:] Accordingly, ** from all these names and from the name "God," which arranged for signifying (σημαίνειν) the divine nature, our mind composes (συντίθησιν) many propositions; namely, that "God exists," or that "God considers," or that "God begets," or "emanates," or "creates," or such like. This [grammatical] composition is also invented by the soul alone and in the soul alone, for a [grammatical] composition is characterized by a subject and of a predicate, but a [material] "supposition" (ὑπόθεσις) and a predicate of the soul is a product/intention (ἔργον). Not in the least, because of the aforesaid intention and formed propositions with these names, do these produce any sort of composition in God. **

[Argument IV]

[Excursus on Real and Intentional Being]

On the other hand, **** our mind is unable to consider in a way other than this sort of [subject-predicate] composition, by which mode it considers other items and even considers God himself. **** The mind can also consider that “this God” is above all beings (τὰ ὄντα), but in no way is it possible that the character of divine simplicity is, thus, arrogantly grasped [as a simple concept], with the result that it considers divine nature according to one act of direct apprehension (ἐπιβολήν), as this [divine] nature simultaneously considers itself as one whole. Because of this, also, **** the soul composes multitudinous propositions, which are composed from real things (πραγμάτων), which aforesaid are the things in the soul, i.e., from intelligible objects (νοημάτων) by which certain beings are doubtlessly distinguished outside of the soul [viz., real entities], in the manner that they exist in themselves, but not as they are considered by the soul [i.e., beings of reason], as is the nature of second intentions (τῶν δευτέρων ἐπιννοιῶν). ****

[Intentional Being: 1. Second Intentions:] Now, on the contrary, **** these very same [first intentions] are distinguished by things (πράγμασι); such as these that are in the soul. Although [first intentions] are not [real] things (πράγματα) differing in God in the this way, just exactly as they exist as concepts (λόγοι) of these aforesaid [things] in the soul (i.e., some whole thing [πρᾶγμα] does not spring up in God under the notion [ὑπὸ τῷ λόγῳ] of goodness, in such a way as it correspondingly holds in relation to God and the divine essence). ****

[Intentional Being: 2. First Intentions:] Thus, for instance, **** the concept (ὁ λόγος) of goodness dwells in the [human] soul, as a concept predicated of the divine essence, but these [attributes] are thusly [real] things (πράγματα), as beings “of the thing” and “in the thing” (i.e., as of that**

one and simplest essence having [something] properly in relation to all such perceptions), albeit not because of what is being perceived by us [directly] in this exact way, but because of having this kind of essence in this exact way (viz., with respect to the distinction of those perceptions which are in us, by which nothing at all real [πραγματικόν] is distinguished ad extra), but rather only the thing is distinguished in the soul (i.e., an intelligible object [νόημα]).__**

[Intentional Being: 3. Second Intentions:] Or something is not distinguished as the res is, but as something understood (νοούμενον), as it happens thus in the notion (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ) of genus and of species and happens entirely among second intentions.

[Intentional Being: 4. First Intentions:] Because of the aforementioned, too, **** __the divine essence is considered as compared to all its own perfections (which some [Franciscans] were accustomed indeed to call energies) and of course this divine essence and its perfections (viz., wisdom and goodness, or paternity and sonship, or begottenness and procession and such) are considered thusly, but they are rather “one something,” inasmuch as we consider something springing up and something reflecting [the essence] by means of the thing. __****

[Argument V]

**** __Classes of Real Distinctions that Exist Outside the Mind Alone (ens extra animam) __****

[A. Real Distinction:] So to say, there is a simultaneous whole, whose res we already call according to a mode: [for example:] “this stone” and “that man,” or “Gabriel,” all of which are individuals (ἄτομα) separated from one another. Or we call “the soul” and “the body,” both of which, even if they have not also been actually separated (as long as the parts are still united together), they are still possible to be separated.

[B. Formal Distinction:] Therefore, as the former mode, [energies] are not the former kinds of res (πράγματα). Yet, ** the former distinction is not real (πραγματική) in the relative sense, but rather all these [items] are one thing thusly: Now, all these res, which surely are one, as God, are res (πράγματα) according to some other mode (ἑτερόν τινα τρόπον). So, not existing in the soul alone, as if manufactured or produced by it, [these things] have a certain existence outside of the soul and exist side-by-side with it. **

[Mayronist Formal-Real Distinction, Class α': Modal Distinction:] ** So, hence, it logically results that the divine essence is necessarily called a res absolutely (ἀπλῶς) and properly (κυρίως), not only as a being [ens] outside the soul and truly existing [e.g., esse and essential], [Mayronist Real Distinction, Class β': Formal Distinctiona] but also as ens in the mode of an individual [e.g., Father and divine essence], and [Mayronist Real Distinction Class γ': Formal Distinctionb] as ens of a quiddity [e.g., divine essence and its attribute] **, and [Mayronist Real Distinction Class δ': Real Essential Distinction:] [ens] of something [numerically] one [e.g., God and a creature].

[C. Comparison of the Real-Essential and the Formal-Real Distinction:] This might even become some term (ὄρος) or foundation (θεμέλιος) of the real distinction [cf., supra, δ'] (between himself and another thing [πράγματος]) in a like manner, ** just as we assert God and some creature (viz., Gabriel) to be really distinguished from one another, because in this distinction—in place of certain terms and their foundations—two whole subsistent things are taken into account. ** Verily, now, let one dismiss what was said at this point, because ** the aforementioned are also distinguished according to their essence (κατ' οὐσίαν) and one thing is a second greater antithesis than the other, but it satisfies present necessity that it is really

(πραγματικῶς) [distinct]. “For things that differ essentially (οὐσιωδῶς διαφέροντα) are really much more distinguished. **”

[D. Terms and Referents:] Certainly, ** one could call the divine essence a thing, but all the perfections within itself are energies, and thusly would not themselves be called “things” (πράγματα), but would be thought of as beings “of the thing” and “in the thing.” It could also be thought of as “a whole together” (τὸ σύνπαν). There would be realia [realities] (πραγματικά) and, from this point, there is no synthesis at all in God out of these items themselves and the essence, whose aforementioned items are real (πραγματικά) and true perfections. **

Chapter 94: On how many items are sought for a composition (σύνθεσιν)

Now, the manner is not merely to be sought in which these items are many (τὸ πλεῖω) and different (διάφορα) with respect to a certain act of [metaphysical] composition, or producing something composite (σύνθετον) out of its own intrinsic items.

[Gennadios’ statement of problems presented from thomistic Armandus]
[Problem 1:] Now, firstly, it is necessary that each of these [aforesaid metaphysical] items have been delimited (πεπερασμένον).

[Solution 1:] ** The divine essence (οὐσία) is infinite (ἄπειρος). **

[Problem 2:] Secondly, it is necessary that each of these items should be a res (πρᾶγμα).

[Solution 2:] ** Now, the divine energy, whether ad intra (ἐνδον) or ad extra (ἐξω), is not (κυρίως) a res, exactly as the divine essence, but rather there is an aliquid rei (τι τοῦ πράγματος) and an aliquid in re (ἐν τῷ πράγματι) **. Now, ‘some or other [indeterminate-common] nature’ (φύσις) is also not an individual (ἄτομος) [nature], since ** the divine

energy is something else, posterior to the divine essence, and is not capable of being separated (χωρίζεσθαι) from the divine essence. **

[Problem 3:] Thirdly, it is necessary that each of these items should be capable of being a part of something (μέρος τίνος).

[Solution 3:] **** What is divine (τὸ Θεῖον) is impartable (ἀμερές). ****

[Problem 4:] Fourthly, it is necessary that, on one account of these items, these be in potency (ἐν δυνάμει), which is in relation to a future (whole) through juxtaposition (παραθέσει).

[Solution 4:] Now, **** God is pure act (εἰλικρινής ἐνέργειά) and there has not at all been mixed with Himself any bit of potency (ἀναμέμικται), viz., what is called a passive (παθητικῆς) potency. ****

[Problem 5:] Fifthly, it is necessary that, on one account of these items, there is activity (ἐνέργεια) that perfects (τελειοῦσα) the future (whole).

[Solution 5:] However, **** in God, nothing at all would exactly be in need of perfection (τελειώσεως) as an incomplete being (ἀτελὲς ὄν), since all the items in God existing by means of the divine essence, are (εἰσὶ) [activities] in virtue of a perfect mode of existence (τελείῳ οὐσίῳ). ****

[Problem 6:] It is necessary that pure energies not also be ultimately entelechies (ἐντελέχειαι), and certainly not be ‘necessary beings’ (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα).

[Solution 6:] Now, **** God is pure act and the ipsum esse (τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν) is necessary simpliciter (ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον). ****

[Problem 7:] Yet, on one account of these items, it is necessary that these are employed in the future (whole).

[Solution 7:] Now, **** the divine nature does not at all employ [these] due to that fact that there is not at all in God ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ ****
[in gradation].

[Problem 8:] Some other things are sought, too, with respect to the fact that some composition comes about (γίνεσθαι) from a greater number of diverse items (διαφερόντων), which same items do not harmonize with God, whether on account of the essence, or on the part of the activity, or from both.

[Solution 8:] ** And because of this very fact, no composite at all comes about in God from the essence and its [pure] act or from the activities. **

[Argument I]

[Florentine Debate:] From the aforesaid explanation, it is clear as well what is necessary to opine also about the recently rehashed discussion among us [Ferrara–Florence 1439]. Now, it is rather obvious that our Church has opined well and justly about those not opining correctly on this subject and banished those opining such wise about the sacred emanations (περιβόλων).

** Now, among us, some happened to suppose only (μόνον) a distinction of reason (τὴν διάκρισιν λόγῳ) between the divine essence and energy (ἐνεργείας), i.e., a conceptual distinction (ἐπινοία), whose heretical leaders existed among Barlaam the Calabrian and the unkind Akindynos, from whose city of ours, claiming to hold up Thrace, did no aid to us, where they were divided among themselves. ** For, in this way, it was probable, too, that these were fighting on account of a falsity, who were inimical among themselves, while the citizens of the time were defending the common opinion on this in respect to the truth. The citizens rejected war from this very same rashness and stubbornness. From this time, Akindynos was of a much worse sort and was harder to bear, since –after Barlaam’s shameful flight from the contest– Akindynos also showed himself conquered by pride. [p. 282] Even before this, he put this together. He had taken up the war against the Church from some kind of factious ambition and became nonetheless fixed with Barlaam more than all other Orthodox.

[Argument II]

[Metaphysical Logic:] ** Accordingly, these and all associated with their heresy were speaking of the nonsensical distinction between the divine essence and energies (commonly called [a distinction] by reason, that is by concept), according to whose mode all whatsoever understood objects of thought (τὰ γινωσκόμενα) have been distinguished (διακέκριται) by the soul, by which they are understood objects of thought, as they are also conceptualized items (νοούμενα), and all these are second intentions (αἱ δεύτεραι ἐπίνοιαι), regarding which there is a logical theory [among Latins]. Now, doubtless, these understood objects are manufactured (κτίζονται) in the soul. Whence, too, the distinction by the soul has been produced (πεποιημένη) and exists in the soul alone. In this way were they also accustomed to assert that all the items attributed-predicated (ἀποδιδόμενα) of the divine essence are distinguished for God, for whom these very items were asserted not [really] to be distinguished but that our mind (νοῦν) distinguishes these same items, while these [conceptual] items form (πλάττοντα) terms (ὅρους) per se, among which such a kind of distinction might be contemplated. ** Yet, ** this falsity is also impossible, for as the divine Scripture attributes these items truly to God, which predicates something to God; namely, justice and wisdom and goodness, then there is said to be a ‘just’ and ‘wise’ and ‘good’ [God]. And teachers of our Church also understand (νοοῦσιν) certain true distinctions [to be] in God under these notions (λόγοις). Thence, they don’t fear that they might inflict some injury to the highest unity (ἄκρα ἐνότητι) and simplicity (ἀπλότητι) of God. ** Yet, ** if a distinction of hypostases is not a fact, the distinction of which is really de re (πραγμάτων), i.e., of subsistences (ἐφεστώτων) or hypostases, whose simplicity according to God’s essence is not contended, so that they distinguish from every place the divine essence of each energy from those items predicated to God, regarding which energy, it happens always to produce a notion (λόγον). So, then, they attribute also ‘modes of distinction,’ the terms of which would certainly not have been produced by the soul, so that there is no distinction [of reason] at all. ** This is so,

as when they distinguish these [attributed items] through something absolute (ἀπολελυμένῳ), or by not being absolute or by a relation (ἀναφορικῶ), which is with respect to itself and in respect to another, which is from something else and which is not from something else, which is participated and which is not participated, etc. All these are said as contradictories (ἀντιφατικά).

[Statement of Purpose:] It is the character of this treatise that the greater of sayings of our teachers are explained more than what is the discourse at present. Yet, these dictums were laid down in his same compilation by sacred Gregory of Thessalonica, who fought at that time for this very thesis of the Church and of those to whom it seemed good, having left out not a one among the ancient doctors through his wisdom and virtue and zeal. And if free time be not at hand for the lesser work from that famous thesis of sacred Gregory (for the implements of apostles were come upon him), he comes upon the thought processes (διάνοιαν) of those teachers of yore, to gather the common opinion among them.

[History of the Conflict:] ** These of the party surrounding Barlaam and Akindynos promoted that some such things be held as opinion: First, they badly held that, out of their act of thinking, the divine essence [p. 283] and energy are distinguished between themselves in whatever way, for in the following way, they were accustomed to account multiple res (πράγματα) existing in God: that he would be composite, as if in him many res (πράγματα) encompass [separated] items that were united together. Therefore, fleeing from thinking the divine as a composite, they thought that this is distinguished according to reason alone (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην). ** They were thinking too that this teacher, whom I call Thomas Aquinas, held agreement on this opinion. ** Aquinas did not support that these aforesaid items be distinguished realiter (πραγματικῶς), but held that these items are fit to distinguish by reason (λόγῳ διαφέρειν). Now, famed Barlaam seemed to breathe the same air of this Thomas, even if he would have altogether despised the question of

Aquinas about the Spirit. ** Indeed, ** it did happen that, by means of those [Kydones brothers] supporting Barlaam and Akindynos, this was the cause for translating the books of this doctor Aquinas into the Greek language. They were thinking that after they had introduced a talented ally from the wisdom of this doctor [Thomas], that they might persuade all others, concerning these matters. Facing these matters, these [translators] also held up the Roman Church with respect, that it took the first place on these questions and, at that, in the manner of the sentential judgment through Thomas [Aquinas] ** –unaware of the fact that many of the magistri [Franciscans and Hervaeus Natalis, OP] among Latins had determined for themselves on this problem rather harmoniously with sacred Gregory of Thessalonica and the whole of our Church. It would not be just to despise their number, since they are most wise and cast their lot on the side of our Church, insofar as, on these matters, these [doctors] magisterially determined precisely these [particular] matters.

[Argument III]

[Class I Thomistic Distinction:] [Thomas] was also considering each instance, falling under the genus “distinction of reason,” as rather unreal (ἀδρανεστέραν). [A.] There was either the distinction from concepts (ἐκ τῶν λόγων; rationis ratiocinantis), [B.] or the distinction from the nature of the thing (ex rei natura; ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως), not merely of reason [e.g., substance and accident].

[Definition of Class I (cf., supra, A):] This means that there was not only a distinction of reason (τοῦ λόγου), i.e., “of the conceptual” (τῆς ἐπινοίας) –whether understood in abstracto (εἰλικρινῶς) or in concreto (συσταλμένως)– which is understood by two terms (ὅροις), but that these terms [or abstract concepts] were produced (πεποιημένοις) by virtue of the soul and by no distinct item in the thing itself is it distinguished.

[Practical Example of Class I (cf., supra, A):] The following would not have been simple (ἀφελής) (so as for the mind to believe the divine essence and its energy are two [items]): The mind divides (διαίρων) and composes Socrates according to its intrinsic power. It composes some such kind of proposition; namely, “Socrates is Socrates.” Yet, in such way, the mind does not know an essential distinction (οὐσιώδη διάκρισιν).

[Class II Thomistic Distinction:] Also there is a distinctio maior (ἰσχυροτέραν) other than this previous [class of] distinction. Yes, indeed, all these former distinctions are beyond the real distinction (πραγματικήν). [Thomas] was used to calling all these “real distinctions” (πραγματικάς) [cf., supra, B], being accustomed thusly to put under the category of “real distinction” (πραγματικήν) all of these [so-called] “real” distinctions [of Meyronnes]. [Class β’–δ’ Mayronist-Scotistic Distinctions:] That is, these [aforementioned and so-called “real” distinctions] were manifestly of a lesser (ἐλάττω) and comparatively unreal difference (αδρανεστέραν διαφοράν). We [Thomists] call all of these “the distinction of reason” (διαφορὰ τοῦ λόγου). These [greater] are distinctions [cf., supra, B] that caused (στρεφομένας) division to be made (χωρίζεσθαι) between:

**** [Thomistic Real Distinction: B1] two subsistent res, and [Thomistic Real Distinction: B2] two individuals, and [Thomistic Real Distinction: B3] two wholes, between either two separables, or two potencies-powers. However, they [viz., Scotists] speak rather of “the essential definition” (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) in [abstracted or formal] concepts (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). ****

[Argument IV]

[Speculation on the contrary to fact possibility that Aquinas could have accepted a real distinction:] If there would have been [a division of] major distinctions (ἰσχυρότεραι), indeed these would have been called precisely differences of reason (λόγων διαφοραί). These definitely are distinguished (διακρινομένων) from one another, but [as such] through the nature (φύσει)

of the terms, whenever they also are in the res following [the rationcination] of the soul, rather than –certainly least of all– after being produced (ποποιημένοις) by the soul in two terms, the latter of which distinction would have been precisely named “a distinction of reason.”

Anyone would have easily went into a fit of sweating from the writings of Thomas on account of the difference of concepts (τῶν λόγων διαφοράν) –whether or not Thomas was not ignorant about the formal distinction (εἰδικὴν διαφοράν; *Distinctio formalis a parte rei*) stemming from the nature of thing– and on account of these minor distinctions and those distinctions lesser than that; namely, those which come in the class behind the real distinction – which Thomas diffusely called “distinctions of reason.”

[Purpose of Chapters 93–94:] Yet, now this Thomas is not our concern, but rather consideration of what is serviceable from such a question concerning of our holy Church and the blessed Gregory of Thessalonica, for the sake of whom we have serviceably published this very discourse at hand regarding these [theological] matters. Whence, ** let the matter along the lines of Thomas, as much as in the investigation that follows, be given leave to others to consider in what way one estimates the sentences of the former [Thomas], or to the sentence of the other teachers, or in respect this, the very truth [of Gregory]. Now, Thomas is not exceedingly important for us, that we should plead on behalf of all his artifices **, even if otherwise that marvelous man is important for us and was the glory of the prior age and even now still seems to be such.

[Metaphysical Logic Against Barlaam and Akindynos:] This was the only provocation of those [Barlaamites and Akindynists] (those reckless men, who had waged war against their own Mother the Church), as befits provocation, in as much as their brain –from so much pride– was possessed of such rattling. ** For how would one otherwise be ignorant that there is a distinction of the divine essence and energy and that it exists in re,

following [the ratiocination] of the soul, just as too this divine essence and its goodness in themselves are outside of our soul? For who does not know, after the soul has been stripped away, granted also that the mind is created, that also the essence of God and the energy thereof and the difference among these two is a difference __**? But, [** __who unaware that] neither actus essendi (τὸ εἶναι), nor “the act of existence” (τὸ ὑπάρχειν), nor the act of projecting (τὸ προάγεσθαι) is opposed to the divine energy: whether ad intra, or ad extra? [Who does not know that] if one’s mind happens pick up all these aforesaid items, the soul predicates these items of the divine energy-attribute, only as far as the fact that God’s being good –in God– is not due to one kind of [Aristotelian] category. __** Said in another way: [** __who does not know] the fact is that goodness itself is in God absolutely (απολελημένως), but not with reference to something else (ἀναφορικῶς) [outside of God], as well as wisdom and mind and such kinds of things, just as there is in God begetting (γέννησις) and emanation (προβολή) and paternity and likewise sonship __**?

Yet, ** __all these realities (even items not yet contemplated [in this treatise]), nonetheless exist and will exist in this way in a nature in virtue of “res” (τοῖς πράγμασι) __**. On one hand, there is no definition (ὁρισμός) of a future (whole), nor of some partial limit (ὁρισμοῦ μέρος), for both of these would not be specifically one (ἐν εἶδει) and an essential definition by [human] reason (λόγῳ τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι). Now, ** __how would it be according to reason (κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν) and how could they [Barlaamites & Akindynists] judge that the items are distinguished in virtue of individual notions (τοῖς λόγοις), which predicate the essential definition and that exist in the nature of the thing (ἐν τῇ τοῦ πράγματος φύσει) __**? Yet, their alarm at composition also used to disturb these people, for it is not true that [as they say]:

Because the [attributes] really are attributed to God, then they are not also attributed according to our thought [alone]. Consequently, there is a composition of these [attributes] and this is [composition] in God from these [items].

Now, from this, the properties that are besought are absent with respect to that act of making some kind of composition and –from this fact– “composition” is absent as well. ** Having supposed the fact that the divine goodness and wisdom and science are in the [divine] res, in the mode that they exist in God, none of these properties is possible of being discovered among the aforementioned, such that no composition at all follows out of necessity ** , and this is clear from the aforesaid explanation.

[Apology on behalf of Palamas:] Now, ** sacred Gregory had all these points within the range of his vision. He both followed, once and for all, the sentence (confirming that of our Mother, the Church) and judgment of the ancient columns of doctors. He was accustomed to say that the divine essence and the divine energy are really distinguished (πραγματικῶς διακρίνεσθαι). He was not used to saying that res (πράγματα) are perfections (τελειότηας) or energies in God according to the thing’s contracted/closely ordered cogitation (ἐννοίαν). Just as we assert that the divine hypostases are res (πράγματα), he used to say that these hypostases are “aliquid rei” (τι τοῦ πράγματος) and “in re” (ἐν τῷ πράγματι), and he said that the whole bespeaks res (πράγματα), as realia [or real non-subsistent entities] (πραγματικά) rather than res (πράγματα), but according to another mode (τρόπον), thinking that these are in the nature of the thing (ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος) and according to the mode [modus concipiendi] of the soul. He did not take up and hold the distinction “by reason alone” (ἐπινοία μόνη), so that it also follow from this that these items exist by means of a concept (ἐπινοία), being that they are not in the very least the divine perfections, as those around

Akindynos and Barlaam nonsensically were blathering **. On which account, Palamas was saying that “πραγματικῶς” is with end of removing what is ‘by reason’ (λογῶ) and “according to a concept” (κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν), but he was distinguishing these same [attributes] by means of concepts (τοῖς λόγοις), which were making known what is essential (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) and manifesting this from the nature of the thing itself (ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως). Now these things suffice, for now, which are said with difficulty as on the run and somewhat simply, as these items would be obvious to many. We will sink deeper into this question, if God wills, in a special treatise on these matters, and as much as is necessary, we shall retrace our steps on this very matter, just as will shall be inspired for us at that time but now it is necessary to examine the rest of sections [of Armandus’ treatise] before us.